We use a unique dataset of German banks' exposure to interest rate risk to derive the following statements about their exposure to this risk and their earnings from term transformation. The systematic factor for the exposure to interest rate risk moves in sync with the shape of the term structure. At bank level, however, the time variation of the exposure is largely determined by idiosyncratic effects. Over time, changes in earnings from term transformation have a large impact on interest income. Across banks, however, the earnings from term transformation do not seem to be a decisive factor for the interest margin.
Non-technical summary
Normally, banks extend long-term loans and collect short-term deposits. This mismatch between the maturities of the assets and liabilities exposes the banks to interest rate risk.
However, this maturity mismatch can also be a source of income (called the earnings from term transformation) because long-term interest rates tend to be higher than short-term interest rates.
In this paper, we investigate the banks' exposure to interest rate risk as well as their earnings from term transformation using a dataset on German banks' exposure to interest rate risk; the exposures in this dataset were derived from the banks' own internal risk models.
The results of our empirical study can be summarized in four statements. Banks' exposure to interest rate risk, their earnings from term transformation, and the dynamics of the term structure 1
Introduction
For many banks, term transformation represents a substantial part of their interest income.
This is especially true of small and medium-sized banks which are engaged in traditional commercial banking, i.e. granting long-term loans and collecting short-term deposits.
It is important to understand the opportunities and risks related to term transformation. Supervisors are especially concerned about banks' interest rate risk. From a financial stability point of view, they have to know what determines changes in banks' exposure to interest rate risk and whether the interest rate regulation has an impact on banks'
behavior. By contrast, practitioners are more interested in the earning opportunities from term transformation. Both issues are addressed in this paper, and four questions guide our analysis: (i) Is there a relation between the systematic factor of the exposure to interest rate risk and the shape of the term structure? (ii) What factors determine (at bank level) the exposure to interest rate risk? (iii) How profitable is term transformation? (iv) Do banks with a large exposure to interest rate risk have a high interest margin?
The main contribution to the literature is to investigate the four questions from above with a unique dataset. This dataset includes the banks' exposure to interest rate risk, derived from their own internal models. by the central banks, the steepness of the term structure increased considerably. From a supervisory point of view, this period was eventful, because the regulation for the interest rate risk in the banking book was introduced (which had previously not been regulated quantitatively).
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give a short overview of the literature in this field. Section 3 describes the methods. In Section 4, the dataset is presented. The results are given in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
Literature
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature of the banks' interest rate risk (See Staikouras (2003) and Staikouras (2006) for a survey). The first one is about the determinants of the banks' exposure to interest rate risk, and the second one deals with the relationship of the interest margin and the possible earnings from term transformation. Fraser et al. (2002) for the U.S., Ballester et al. (2009) for Spain and Entrop et al. (2008) for Germany investigate the determinants of the banks' exposure to interest rate risk. They find that the belonging to certain banking groups, the banks' size, their earnings and balance composition, and the banks' application of derivatives have a significant impact on their exposure to interest rate risk. In this paper, however, we are not interested in the banks' level of interest rate exposure, but in the timely changes in the exposure. English (2002) analyses the relationship of the (net) interest margin and the shape of the term structure. Using aggregate data for a cross section of countries, he finds little evidence that the possible earnings from term transformation (i.e. the slope of the term structure) have an impact on the interest margin. To some extent, our paper is related to Czaja et al. (2010) . The authors extract the earnings from term transformation out of stock returns by analyzing a benchmark bond portfolio with the same exposure to interest rate risk as the underlying stocks. They find that a substantial part of the stock returns is due to term transformation. In our paper, we also choose a benchmark portfolio to infer a bank's earnings from term transformation.
As stated above, we can use data on the banks' exposure to interest rate risk, derived from the banks' internal models, and, therefore, do not have to estimate it. There is a large body of literature that deals with just this question, i.e. the question of how to estimate a bank's exposure to interest rate risk. Often banks' balance sheets are used, which are broken down into positions of relatively homogeneous repricing periods. For each position, a measure of interest rate sensitivity is assigned, for instance, the duration, and the weighted sum of the positions' duration is a measure of the bank's exposure to interest rate risk (See, for instance, Sierra and Yeager (2004) ). The main problem of these approaches is that they yield a rather imprecise estimate of a bank's actual exposure, because the data from the balance sheet is often not detailed enough and off-balance sheet positions, especially interest rate swaps, are ignored. Entrop et al. (2008) use time series of balance sheet data and even their measure can only explain about 27% of the cross-sectional variation in the actual interest rate exposure of a sample of more than 1,000 German banks. Another method consists in inferring the banks' interest rate risk exposure from the banks' stock returns (See Yourougou (1990) and Fraser et al. (2002) ).
This approach, however, is only applicable to the listed banks and not to the unlisted ones, which account for the vast majority of banks in most countries.
Methods

Exposure in the course of time
As mentioned above, we do not need to estimate the banks' interest rate exposure from stock market returns or from balance sheet data, and yet the data analysis poses econometric challenges. The challenges arise owing to the characteristics of the dataset: The panel is highly unbalanced. On average, there is around one observation for each bank in each year, but the time difference between two observations differs widely, from one month to more than three years. The number of observations per bank is also widely different in the cross section of banks.
The variable X i (t) with i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, ..., T denotes the exposure to interest rate risk of bank i in month t. We model this exposure (normalized to the banks own funds) as follows: Our aim is to extract the systematic component μ(t) with t = 1, .., T from the exposure data (See Equation (1)). One straightforward method is to calculate the change in the cross-sectional average exposure X(t) in month t (or the cross-sectional average exposure in a given quarter). The problem with this approach is that the dataset is highly unbalanced, i.e. not only does the number of banks for which there exist exposure data in a given month vary, the composition of the sample in a given month may also change systematically. For instance, it may be the case that there is a cluster of observations of banks with large exposure to interest rate risk in certain months. To show the problem with this approach, we write the change in the average cross sectional exposure as
where α(t) is the cross-sectional average of the bank-specific variable α i of those banks for which there is an observation in month t. As the composition of this sample changes in the course of time, the cross-sectional average α(t) of the time-invariant bank-specific effects α i differs from month to month. out(t) is the share of those banks for which there exist data in month t and whose previous exposure was in excess of the regulatory threshold. ν(t)
is the average cross-sectional idiosyncratic change in the banks' exposure to interest rate risk for the banks for which there is an observation in month t. The average idiosyncratic change can be expected to cancel out in the event that the cross section is sufficiently large.
When investigating the changes in the average exposure (as described above), it remains unclear whether a change in the observed average exposure ΔX(t) is due to changes in the systematic component of the exposure to interest rate risk μ(t) or whether the composition of banks in the sample (α(t) − α(t − 1)) has changed, or whether changes in the supervisory pressure out(t) − out(t − 1) are responsible.
We choose the following method of mitigating the problem of changing sample composition: Instead of the exposure levels X i (t), we investigate the change in the exposure of the same bank, as stated in Equation (3). Let T i (j) with j = 1, ..., n i denote the jth observation for bank i. n i is the number of exposure observations for bank i. We define
as the change in bank's exposure, and
as the time span during which this change occurs. Analysing the changes instead of the levels is accompanied by a loss of information; for instance, we can use only those banks for which there are at least two observations, i.e. n i ≥ 2.
To illustrate the notation, we give the following example. The interest rate risk expo- (4)).
Applying Equation (3) to Equation (1), we obtain
with
The variable C i (j) does not depend on the unobservable bank-specific effect α i and the coefficients μ(t) with t = 1, ..., T and δ can be estimated with an OLS regression. To see this, we rewrite Equation (5) as
where j = 2, . . . , n i and i = 1, ..., N . Note that, by assumption, the monthly idiosyncratic changes ε i (t) and thereby the idiosyncratic changes η i (j) themselves are cross-sectionally independent. In addition, the idiosyncratic changes η i (j) are also serially independent, because, by construction, the changes in exposure refer to non-overlapping periods, i.e. the monthly idiosyncratic change ε i (t) (for a given month t) appears exactly once in the idiosyncratic change η i (j) (in the event that
However, the variance of η i (j) would not be constant even if the monthly idiosyncratic changes ε i (t) were homoskedastic. Even under this assumption, the variance of η i (j) would not be constant, but proportional to the time span D i (j) between the current and the previous observation.
To account for this heteroskedasticity, we use White-corrected standard errors. The total number of observations that can be used in the regression (5) amounts to
The approach above is comparable to a panel estimation with fixed effects: in both approaches, the bank-specific effect is removed by first differences (or, equivalently, by subtracting the time series average). In addition, this approach makes it possible to deal with a highly unbalanced panel.
Earnings from term transformation
We cannot directly observe which part of the banks' interest income is due to term transformation. Therefore, we use an indirect method and we estimate the bank's earnings from term transformation by analyzing a bond portfolio which has the same exposure to interest rate risk as the bank under consideration. We assume that the same exposure to interest rate risk yields the same earnings from term transformation. If this assumption holds and if the bank's exposure to interest rate risk is known (as in our case), we are able
to obtain a precise estimate of the bank's earnings from term transformation.
The bond portfolio above is based on an investment strategy that consists of revolvingly investing in ten-year par-yield bonds and of revolvingly selling par-yield bonds with one year of maturity. 2 The basis point value (BPV) of this strategy is around BP V S = 0.372 euro per 1,000 euro of volume (See the appendix). The BPV of a bank is
where E i (t) is the regulatory capital (own funds) of bank i in month t, and X i (t) is, as defined above, the exposure to interest rate risk. Note that X i (t) is the loss in present value due to a parallel upward shift of 130 basis points in the term structure in relation to the bank's own funds E i (t) (which explains the multiplication with E i (t) and the division by 130).
The variable k i (t) states the ratio of the bank's interest rate exposure to the interest rate risk exposure of the bond portfolio, i.e.
If the same exposure to interest rate risk translates into the same earnings from term transformation, the scaling factor k i (t) concerning the exposure should also apply to the earnings from term transformation, i.e.
where F i (t) and F S (t) are the earnings from term transformation of bank i and of the bond portfolio, respectively. Combining (11) and (12), we see that a bank's earnings from term transformation depend multiplicationally on two factors: the bank's exposure to interest rate risk X i (t) and the market conditions F S (t).
We are not primarily interested in the absolute earnings from term transformation, but in their relation to total assets T A i (t) (Margin from term transformation variable:
T M i (t)) and the bank's interest income R i (t) (variable: share i (t)). Note that total assets T A i (t) and interest income R t (t) are reported only once a year (and, in the case of the interest income, for the whole 12 previous months), i.e. 15, 27, 39, 51 (13) and 3, 15, 27, 39, 51 (14) where the points in time correspond to the year 3, 15, 27, 39, 51 (15) Note that this panel does not suffer so much from gaps in the data, because we are now looking at yearly data (instead of monthly data as in the analyses before). Consequently, the Δ−operator means the difference to the previous year, i.e. a lag of 12 months.
We estimate Equation (15) twice, once as a fixed effects model and once as a betweengroup model. The fixed effect model 15, 27, 39, 51 (16) gives information on how changes in a bank's earnings from term transformation affect the bank's interest margin. If changes in the earnings from term transformation do not affect other components of the interest income, we expect the coefficient β w to equal one.
By contrast, the between group model
gives evidence as to whether banks with higher interest rate risk exposure tend to have Table 1 , we report summary statistics of the banks' change in exposure to interest rate risk C i (j), the time between two observations D i (j), and the number of observations per bank n i . For confidentiality reasons, we cannot report descriptive statistics about the exposure X i (t) itself or the regulatory dummy out i (t). The dataset consists of 4,014 observations of changes in the interest rate risk exposure. On average, the change in the Basel interest rate coefficient is close to zero. The 25 percent largest change is 3.02 percentage points, the 25 percent lowest change is -2.42 percentage points.
The time between two observations is, on average, 14 months, i.e. on average, there is one observation for 13 gaps. The sample covers 1,562 banks, i.e. for these banks, there are at least two observations available (n i ≥ 2). Given a bank is in the sample, there are, on average, about 3.5 exposure observations (and one observation fewer when we refer to observations of changes in the exposure). The sample is biased towards the small and medium-sized savings and cooperative banks. In December 2009, savings banks and cooperative banks accounted for 22.2% and 59.7% of all banks in Germany, respectively.
For the variable change in the interest rate exposure C i (j) in our sample, the respective figures are 28.5% and 67.8%.
As outlined above, we analyze a passive investment strategy for government bonds.
The government bond yields are taken from Deutsche Bundesbank which uses the Svensson (1994) approach to estimate the term structure from government bonds (See Schich (1997) On average, this margin is around 225 basis points in relation to total assets.
Empirical results
Exposure to interest rate risk
As described in Subsection 3.1, we run the regression (5) to estimate changes in the systematic component of the exposure to interest rate risk μ(1), . . . , μ(T ). As stated above, to account for possible deviations from the OLS assumptions concerning the covariance matrix of the residuals, we make use of the heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimation according to White (1980) . In addition to the variable out i (t), which measures supervisory pressure as a dummy variable for banks exceeding the regulatory threshold, we introduce another variables for the regulation: the dummy variable out2 i (t) which takes on the value one in the event that a bank is far above the regulatory threshold, i.e. that the banks' Basel interest rate coefficient is larger than 0.3.
In Table 2 , we report the regression results. Owing to lack of space, the 51 coefficients The results shown in Table 2 make it possible to gauge the impact of different factors, at bank level, on the exposure to interest rate risk. Above, we investigated the system-atic factor that drives the banks' exposure to interest rate risk, i.e. μ(t). Now, we are investigating, at bank level, how far the systematic factor, regulation and idiosyncratic effects impact the exposure to interest rate risk. As before, we measure the systematic factor with the coefficients μ(t), the regulatory pressure with out i (t) and out2 i (t), and the idiosyncratic factor with η i (j). By analysing the coefficient of determination R 2 in different specifications, it is possible to assess the contribution of the different variables.
In Table 2 , we show the coefficient of determination for different regression models: the full model (column 2), the model without the regulation variables (column 3) and the model with only the regulation variables (column 4). The R 2 of the full model is 17.24%, i.e. the combined contribution of the systematic factor and the regulation to the total timely variation of the exposure is 17.24% and, therefore, 82.76% of the variation is due to idiosyncratic effects. These effects may be changes in the bank's business model, speculation about abrupt changes in the interest rates, and changes in the bank's own funds. Note that we consider the exposure relative to the bank's own fund. That is why the relative exposure changes in the event that the absolute exposure remains constant and the own funds decrease or increase.
With the help of the two other specifications, it is possible to disentangle the contributions of the systematic factor and of the regulation. One can expect some correlation between the regulatory variables out i (t) and out2 i (t) on the one hand, and the variables e i (t) on the other: In the event that the bank's exposure is above the supervisory threshold, it can be expected that there will be more observations (because, in this case, the bank is likely to report its interest rate exposure to the supervisor more frequently). In fact, it turns out that the sum of the R 2 s of the two incomplete models is slightly larger than the R 2 of the full model, i.e. 10.08% + 8.63% > 17.24%. To sum up the shares of explained variation to 0.1724, we scale them. The share of explained variation due to the systematic factor is 9.29% (= 10.08% x 17.24/(10.08+8.63)), the share due to regulation is 7.95%.
When extracting the systematic factor for the exposure to interest rate risk, we see a strong co-movement. But, when we look at the bank level, the systematic factor accounts for a bit more than 9% of the timely variation in the interest rate risk exposure. Regulation accounts for slightly less than 8% of the timely variation. Banks with exposure above the regulatory threshold of 20% reduce their exposure on average by 3.31 percentage points between two reports. If the exposure is above 30%, the reduction is even higher and amounts to 7.96 (=3.31+4.65) percentage points.
Earnings from term transformation
To calculate the earnings from term transformation as outlined in Subsection 3.2, we need the information on the banks' exposure X i (t) in each month t. However, the dataset includes around 13 gaps for each observation. We determine intermediate gaps by linear interpolation. Gaps at the beginning and at the end are filled in with the bank's first and last exposure, respectively.
In Table 3 , we show the banks' estimated earnings from term transformation normalized to total assets (the ratio T M i (t) as defined in Equation (13)). We give the results for the median bank and we break down the results into banking groups and years.
Over the whole period 2005-2009 and over all banking groups, the median bank earned 26.3 basis points (in relation to total assets and per annum). There are, however, large differences across the years and across the banking groups. In 2005, when term transformation was quite profitable, the median bank earned more than 56 basis points from term transformation, whereas in 2008, when the term structure was nearly flat, the median bank earned barely more than nine basis points. The results illustrate that earnings from term transformation are quite volatile in the course of time, depending on the current and past shape of the term structure.
Savings banks and cooperative banks are said to rely heavily on earnings from term transformation. And, in fact, the earnings from term transformation for the median savings bank (29.2 bp) and for the median cooperative bank (30.2 bp) are much higher than the ones for the median private commercial bank (6.9 bp) and for the median other bank (6.8 bp). This reliance on term transformation among savings banks and cooperative banks can be also seen when we look at the share of earnings from term transformation in relation to interest income (See Table 4 ). For the median savings bank and cooperative bank, this share is around 15% and 13%, respectively, for the median private commercial bank it amounts to less than 5%.
These results are consistent with earlier findings for the German banking sector. Entrop et al. (2008) find that German savings and cooperative banks have a significantly higher exposure to interest rate risk than other banks, and practitioners gauge that German banks earnings from term transformation amount to between 10% and 35% of the banks interest income. 3
In Table 5 , we show the results of the panel regression, the fixed effect or withinmodel (Equation (16)) and the between-group model (Equation (17) The results of the within estimation, at least for the savings and cooperative banks (which account for more than 90% of all observations in our sample), are consistent with expectations: Although the two β w -coefficients are significantly smaller than 1 (around 0.5), the interest income of savings and cooperative banks rises and falls in accordance with the respective earnings from term transformation. The fact that a 1 basis point increase in the earnings from term transformation does not translate in a 1 basis point increase in the interest income may be due to a negative correlation between the earnings from term transformation and the risk premia on loans. In times of a boom the term structure tends to be steep and the risk premia (and thereby the mark-up) tend to be low. According to the coefficients of determination R 2 , the timely variation in the earnings from term transformation accounts for roughly one-third of the variation in the interest margin (for savings and cooperative banks).
The results of the between-group model do not indicate that banks with high interest rate exposure tend to have a high interest margin. It appears that the interest margin is not much determined by the banks' exposure to interest rate risk. To be fair, for the savings banks we see a significantly positive coefficient, however the explanatory power, measured by the R 2 , is relatively low (4.08% compared to the R 2 of the corresponding within-regression of 30.48%), for the other banking groups (apart from the regression with all banks) we do not find any significant coefficient. One possible explanation of this finding is that banks take the interest rate risk into account when they allocate the budgets to the different sorts of risk and that the risk from term transformation yields approximately the same return as, for instance, credit risk, measured in terms of risk units.
Conclusion
Using a unique dataset of German banks' exposure to interest rate risk, we can address questions about the banks' behavior concerning this sort of risk and about their earnings from term transformation. We see that the systematic factor of the exposure to interest rate risk indeed moves in accordance with the possible earnings from term transformation.
At bank level, however, bank specific and regulatory effects are far more important. For savings and cooperative banks, earnings from term transformation are an important source of interest income, and timely changes in earnings from term transformation strongly affect their interest income. However, in the cross-section, the interest margin is not much determined by the exposure to interest rate risk.
The results apply especially to the small and medium-sized banks in the German savings and cooperative bank sector, which are engaged in traditional commercial banking.
These results could be transferred to similarly structured banks in other countries. 
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